Market Feedback And Managers’ Decisions In Private Placement – Evidence From Chinese Family Firms by Li, Wanli et al.
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2016 Volume 32, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1049 The Clute Institute 
Market Feedback And Managers’ Decisions 
In Private Placement – Evidence From 
Chinese Family Firms 
Wanli Li, Xi’an Jiaotong University & Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, China 
Weiwei Gao, Xi’an Jiaotong University, China 
Wei Sun, Xi’an Jiaotong University, China 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
What effect does market feedback have on managers’ decisions on private placement in family firms? Based on 
information asymmetry, agency theory, and corporate governance theory, we investigate the relationship between 
managers’ final decisions and market feedback to the announcement. We find that managers in family firms accept 
market feedback in decision-making and their attitude can be affected by many external factors. Managers tend to 
listen to the market when family firms are non-high-tech, when family members participate in purchasing the placed 
shares, when family members serve as managers, and when separation of control rights from ownership is small. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
amily firms rely too much on internal funds to meet the business demand before. With the 
development of the business, external financing channels should be considered (Coleman & Carsky, 
1999). However, due to information asymmetry, small-to-medium enterprises have much difficulty in 
acquiring bank loans (Berger & Udell, 2002; Chakraborty & Hu, 2006; Uchida et al., 2012). In 2006, private 
placement was recognized as one way of refinancing in China for the issue of the Administrative Measures for 
Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies by the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission). Since then, 
many Chinese companies, especially family firms, have refinanced through private placement in recent years due to 
its low requirement.  
 
Table 1. Announcement and Implement of Private Placement 
 Final State 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Listed 
companies 
Total 167 173 139 294 223 246 224 1466 
Competed 90 107 83 197 133 136 119 865 
Adjusted 51 49 42 65 56 69 80 412 
Cancelled 26 17 14 32 34 41 25 189 
Family firms 
Total 53 63 43 86 113 111 108 577 
Completed 32 42 27 59 70 64 59 353 
Adjusted 13 15 11 17 25 28 35 144 
Cancelled 8 6 5 10 18 19 14 80 
Note: We get the data from the website http://www.cninfo.com.cn/ where publish the information of private placement. One firm may have 
several private placements. 
 
Table 1 is the announcement and implement of private placement from 2006 to 2012. It shows that the number of 
private placement has increased from 167 in 2006 to 224 in 2012. By 2012, there have been 1466 announcements in 
total, among which family firms account for nearly 40%. Obviously, private placement has become an increasingly 
important way for companies, especially family firms, to refinance. However, among the announcements from 
family firms in 2006, only 70% are completed as previously announced and 30% adjusted or cancelled, compared 
F 
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with the figures 65% and 35% in 2012. Since family firms prefer private to public equity financing to maintain 
family control (Wu et al., 2007), what causes them not to implement the announced plans?  
 
In many cases, managers will evaluate the effect on firm value before making decisions. They will not make 
announcements until they confirm that these decisions can bring a positive effect to the company. According to the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH), capital market has a strong ability to process public information, which is 
superior to any individuals or institutions. If the market considers the company to neglect some important factors 
when making decisions, it will view the announcement as a negative signal and signal back to the company by 
trading down the stock price. Actually, in Luo’s (2005) framework, managers are viewed to learn from the market if 
their M&A decisions are affected by market reaction. Namely the market can not only redistribute wealth but also 
generate information to guide managers’ decisions. So under this circumstance, should managers neglect market 
signal and complete the deal as previously determined, or accept market feedback and make some changes to the 
previous decision? In other words, is market feedback the main reason why family firms not implement the 
announced plans? 
 
Family firms are often viewed as bearing exploitation of minority shareholders (Morck & Yeung, 2003) and lacking 
professional management. However, some evidence shows that family firms outperform non-family firms multi-
dimensionally (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), which results from its special ownership 
structure. Namely family shareholders act as stewards more than agents. The core of the debate between the former 
and the latter is that, what roles do managers in family firms play in decision-making process. What kind of 
influence does it bring to managers’ behavior during private placement?  
 
Focusing on the effect of market feedback on managers’ final decisions, we analyze the private placement 
announced by Chinese family firms from 2006 to 2012 and examine the influence of firm characteristics. The 
findings contribute to two areas. First, different from previous studies that examine the role of market feedback in 
firms’ investment decisions, we apply it into firms’ financing decisions. Second, from the perspective of two-way 
information flow, we relate managers’ decisions to market feedback and show that the market plays an important 
role in managers’ decision-making.  
 
The remainder is as follows. Section II reviews the literature. Section III develops the hypotheses. Section IV 
focuses on sample, data, and methodology. Section V presents the results. Section VI offers the results of robustness 
checks. Section VII concludes. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Market Feedback and Managers’ Decisions 
 
Luo (2005) defines the relationship between managers’ decisions and market feedback as managers’ learning. Kau 
et al. (2008) propose a different definition, which goes like: if the market reacts positively to the announcement and 
the deal is finally completed, or the market reacts negatively to the announcement and the deal is finally canceled, 
then managers learn from the market. No matter how learning is defined, the market has a significant effect on 
managers’ decisions. 
 
Studies on market feedback mainly concentrate on managers’ investment decisions, especially on M&A (Dye & 
Sridhar, 2002; Kau et al., 2008; Aktas et al., 2011). Market has a strong ability in processing public information and 
can generate much new information after observing the announcement. It will feed the new information back to 
firms by impounding the information into stock prices. For example, the market will regard it as a bad signal in 
M&A when acquirer’s pricing is higher than target’s market value. Acquirer’s stock price will consequently fall. 
Extracting useful information, managers will then accept market feedback by adjusting the previously announced 
plan (Dye & Sridhar, 2002). However, Blanchard et al. (1993) posit that market feedback may play a limited role in 
managers’ decision-making due to some factors such as managers’ self-interest. Managers may ignore market 
feedback due to their hubris (Roll, 1986). Aktas et al. (2009) also hold the same view that although the M&A may 
bring negative effect to firm value, managers will still complete it as previously announced owing to their 
overconfidence. 
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Jennings and Mazzeo (1991) argue that whether managers accept market feedback mainly depends on the amount of 
their private information, which is also examined by Luo (2005). In addition, Luo (2005) believes that managers 
tend to accept market feedback when the cost of canceling the initial decision is less, when information asymmetry 
is lower, or when the firm is smaller. From the perspective of corporate governance, Kau et al. (2008) conduct a 
study on M&A, which shows that managers are more likely to cancel the announced decisions when the market 
reacts negatively to the announcement and are more likely to accept market feedback when their interests are more 
aligned with shareholders. 
 
Private Placement 
 
Because public offering can signal to the market that firm value is overestimated, it has a generally negative 
announcement effect (Asquith & Mullins, 1986; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986). However some other studies on IPO 
show that firm’s initial returns depend on market demand, which plays an important role in its pricing (Mauer & 
Senbet, 1992; Agarwal et al., 2008). Regardless of initial returns, stock price will go to balance which reflects firms’ 
true value (Agarwal et al., 2008), indicating that the market not only has a super ability in information discovering 
and processing but also can make adjustment to previous prediction. Similarly, the market should also be able to 
make prediction and react to the announcement of private placement. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that investors tend to overweight firms’ short-term performance at the expense 
of long-run performance. Thus abnormal returns around announcement day of private placement are very high while 
post-announcement stock price performance is greatly negative, indicating that the market can make some 
adjustments to the overestimated stock price and reacts timely to new emerging information (Hertzel et al., 2002; 
Tan et al., 2002). However, some scholars hold a different view that the market underreacts to the announcement of 
private placement (Chen et al., 2002).1 
 
Some other studies on private placement conclude that private placement can be used by large shareholders to 
realize their self-interest. When they participate in purchasing shares, the discounts of the placement increase with 
the amount they purchase. It is consistent with the fact that large shareholders realize their control gains through 
private placement. Managers tend to sell stocks to passive investors to get loose supervision and achieve their aims 
to better control the firms by giving passive investors large discounts as compensation (Barclay et al., 2007). 
 
Above all, we can see that the literature on private placement mainly focuses on its announcement effect, its long- 
and short-term wealth effect, the stock price movement henceforth, and the discounts. Very few consider the effect 
of market feedback. As main decision-makers, managers can be affected by many external factors such as the 
supervision from boards and shareholders, the punishment when making wrong decisions, and the macro economic 
conditions. Therefore, the study on the relationship between managers’ decisions and market feedback is very 
necessary. 
 
Managers in Family Firms: Agents or Stewards? 
 
The main conflict of early work on family business is whether managers in family firms act as agents or stewards. 
Agency problems arise when managers with superior private information exploit firm resources to maximize their 
personal gains, which stems from information asymmetry between the principle and the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). The conflict between owners and managers is substantially reduced with family involvement in both 
ownership and management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Due to significant shareholdings, family shareholders have 
incentive to supervise managers, thus reducing monitoring costs (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and improving the 
performance. However, agency problems may be more severe when there is little alignment between managers and 
the family or when managers can control the business with little ownership.  
 
Actually, agency costs in family firms are mainly between the family and the minority shareholders (Morck & 
Yeung, 2003). Generally speaking, the family has strong preference of control rights, which will probably make 
                                                
1 The difference in the view on the announcement effect of private placement results from the difference in countries’ regulations. For example, in 
Singapore, shares cannot be sold to directors or substantial shareholders. But there are no special restrictions on this characteristic in China. 
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private placement a tool for them to entrench other minority shareholders (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2005). They may 
destroy firm value by separating control rights from cash-flow rights using control-enhancing mechanisms 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006). On one hand, too much ownership with unchallenged control rights can induce owners’ 
power abusing to exploit the business such as the extraordinary dividend payouts (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2000). 
On the other hand, if the family aims to control the business with little ownership (also called pyramiding structure), 
other ways to exploit minority shareholders and gain control rights will emerge (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). 
Both of them go against the maximization of firm value. 
 
While the agency theory posits managers’ self-interesting behavior, the stewardship theory indicates that regardless 
of ownership, managers in family firms will subordinate personal goals to business goals and tend to pursue non-
financial goals (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Actually, family owners often engage in emotional investment in the 
business (Bubolz, 2001). Consequently, managers in family firms often hold superior attitudes of stewardship 
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006), which can improve the performance. However, the emotional ties don’t blind the 
owners to impose agency cost control mechanisms on managers (Chrisman et al, 2007), suggesting that managers in 
family firms act as some kind of combination of agents and stewards. 
 
Literature Summary 
 
Studies on market feedback effect mainly focus on managers’ investment decisions, with very few concerning the 
potential relationship between market feedback and financing decisions. Just as what we have mentioned above, 
managers also tend to utilize market feedback to improve financing decisions.  
 
In the past, very limited attention was paid to small-to-median enterprises, especially family firms, in the studies on 
both market feedback and private placement. Actually, more and more Chinese family firms start to use private 
placement as a main channel to refinance in recent years. What’s more, whether managers in family firms act as 
agents or stewards has been debated for years. It is valuable to investigate managers’ behavior in Chinese family 
firms during private placement. In family firms’ private placement, managers’ attitude towards market feedback 
should be taken into account. Therefore, we discuss the relationship between market feedback and managers’ final 
decisions in Chinese family firms’ private placement and examine the factors of this relationship. 
 
HYPOTHESE DEVELOPMENT 
 
Previous studies argue that capital market can generate new information, which is not known to managers, and 
impound it into stock prices (Dye & Sridhar, 2002). Some researchers examine that managers’ final decisions can be 
affected by market reaction to the announcement in investment decision-making (Blanchard et al., 1993; Luo, 2005; 
Kau et al., 2008). Firms will adjust the announced repurchased amounts of shares based on the stock returns 
following the announcement (Stephens & Weisbach, 1998). Managers’ final decisions are influenced by market 
reaction to the registration of seasoned equity offering (Giammarino et al., 2004). Actually, not just the investment 
decisions, other corporate actions such as refinancing, can also be influenced by market feedback. Managers’ 
behavior is reflected in their every decision (Luo, 2005). 
 
Due to the highly concentrated ownership, family firms prefer private placement to public equity financing to 
maintain family control (Wu et al., 2007). Family involvement in management makes managers more prudent in 
making decisions. Compared with non-family firms, they may pay more attention to market feedback. What’s more, 
their behavior can be affected by many external factors such as firms’ industry, the supervision imposed on them, 
and the corporate governance mechanism. How do these factors work in managers’ attitude towards market 
feedback in family firms? 
 
First, market feedback to the announcement is less informative for high-tech firms than others. Compared with 
private placement, public offering requires firms to disclose more information, which can induce larger conveying 
costs. Furthermore, the disclosed information is easy to be used by competitors, which thus may be conducive to 
firms’ development. Hence, high-tech family firms have the incentive not to disclose such information when it is 
disadvantageous to their competitiveness (Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990). Therefore, family firms with 
abundant sensitive information prefer private placement (Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1999). 
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Consequently, the information asymmetry of private placement is higher for high-tech firms than others (Wu, 2004), 
although the disclosure of proprietary technology information is important for market to evaluate the project covered 
by the placement. Thus, family firms tend to reduce the disclosure of such critical information, resulting in the 
difficulty for outsiders to evaluate firm value. So high-tech firms have severe information opacity. Namely, family 
firms’ industry can influence the information disclosure. Holding plenty of private information, managers in high-
tech family firms may regard market feedback less informative and tend to ignore it. 
 
Second, according to the monitoring hypothesis, private placement can strengthen the supervision on managers. By 
introducing active large shareholders, private placement can increase ownership concentration, which can reduce 
agency problems and increase firm value (Wruck, 1989). Wu (2004) conducts a study on purchasers’ properties and 
conclude that the placements with managers participating in purchasing have more discounts than those without 
managers, and the discounts increase with the decrease of managers’ shareholding proportion. This evidence 
indicates that managers are self-interested. Hence, absence from monitoring managers can bring family firms much 
loss. Many studies show that the blockholders have greater incentive to oversight management. Therefore, family 
members participating in purchasing placed shares can restrain managers’ self-interested behavior. Due to the 
supervision from family members, managers tend to adjust the previously announced plan according to market 
feedback in shareholders’ best interests.  
 
Third, managers’ behavior can be affected not only by their nature but also by the kinship with leaders and the 
corporate governance mechanism (Chrisman et al., 2007). Whether managers in family firms act as stewards or 
agents has been debated for years. More closely aligned with firms, managers have more propensities to listen to the 
market (Kau et al., 2008), thus they act more as stewards. In China, most family firms are yet in their early stage. 
Many family members participate in both firms’ daily management and the allocation of residual claims. That is, 
control rights are little separated from ownership. This mechanism narrows the information gap between controllers 
and managers. Under this circumstance, family managers act as stewards more than agents. Therefore, they have 
much motivation to run the business well. So they will notice market feedback and make proper decisions to 
improve firm value. To summarize: 
 
H1: Managers in family firms are more likely to accept market feedback than those in non-family firms in private 
placement. 
 
H2: Managers in family firms are less likely to accept market feedback in private placement when the firm is high-
tech. 
 
H3: Managers in family firms are more likely to accept market feedback in private placement when family members 
participate in purchasing the placed shares. 
 
H4: Managers in family firms are more likely to accept market feedback in private placement when family members 
serve as managers or when the separation of control rights from ownership is small. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample and Data 
 
We select announcement day of board resolution as pricing benchmark day. It is hand collected from the Report of 
Issuance of Private Placement announced on the website http//www.cninfo.com.cn. Other data are from CSMAR and 
WIND database. We define family firms as: if the business is ultimately controlled by one family or several 
connected families who together control at least 20% of the outstanding votes, it’s a family firm (La Porta et al., 
1999). Our initial sample includes 577 family firms during 2006 and 2012. The sample is then screened as follows: 
incomplete data, placements aiming at purchasing assets, financial firms, ST and *ST firms and placements without 
CSRC’s approval are rejected.2 Finally, 459 family firms are identified. Ultimate ownership is measured with cash-
                                                
2 The CSRC examines the plan according to the Detailed Rules for Implement of Non-public Issuance for Listed Companies. We focus on the 
influence of market feedback on managers’ final decisions. So we exclude the data. 
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flow rights while ultimate control rights with voting rights. Separation of control rights from ownership is measured 
with the difference between cash-flow rights and voting rights.  
 
Method 
 
Market feedback is measured with market reaction to the announcement. We use event study to examine market 
reaction and obtain CAR (cumulative abnormal return) using market model: 
 
Rit=αi+βi RMt+εit 
 
where Rit is firms’ daily stock returns. RMt is the daily returns of market portfolio. εit is the daily abnormal returns. 
We select [-180,-30] days before announcement day as the estimation period. If stocks are suspended that day, the 
first trading day after the announcement is the benchmark day. [-5,5] days around announcement day are selected as 
the event window. 
 
Models and Variables 
 
Table 2. Definition Of Variables 
Variables Definition 
Complete It equals 1 if placement is completed as previously announced; otherwise it equals 0.3 
Accept It equals 1 if market reacts negatively and the firm gives up placing, or market reacts positively and the firm 
completes the previously announced plan; otherwise it equals 0. 
CAR Market reaction to the announcement. It is the cumulative abnormal return from -5 to 5 days around 
announcement day. 
Family It equals 1 if the firm is family firm; otherwise it equals 0. 
Tech It equals 1 if the firm is high-tech; otherwise, it equals 0. 
Part It equals 1 if family members participate in purchasing shares; otherwise it equals 0. 
Serve It equals 1 if family members serve as CEOs or chairman of the board; otherwise it equals 0. 
Wedge Separation of control rights from ownership. 
Larown Share proportions held by the largest shareholder. 
Famown Share proportions held by the family. 
Market It equals 1 if it is in “bull market” and equals 0 if it is in “bear market”.4 
ROA Firms’ latest net margin before announcement day scaled by the assets. 
Level The gearing from recent financial statements. 
Lnsize Natural log of firm size. 
Note: Q1, Q2, and Q3 are control variables. Q1 includes Larown, Market, ROA, Level, and Lnsize while Q2 and Q3 include Famown, Market, 
ROA, Level, and Lnsize. 
 
We use the following Logit models to test the hypotheses: 
 
Logit(Complete)=β+α1CAR+α2Family+α3CAR×Family +α4Q1。 (1) 
 
Logit(Complete)=β+α1Tech+α2CAR+α3Part+α4Serve+α5Wedge+α6CAR×Tech+α7CAR×Part 
 
+α8CAR×Serve +α9CAR×Wedge+α10Q2 (2) 
 
Logit(Accept)=β+α1Tech+α2Part+α3Serve+α4Wedge+α5Q3 (3) 
 
Model 1 is to test the effect of family involvement on managers’ attitude towards market feedback. Model 2 is the 
key model. Model 3 is for robustness checks. Definition of variables is in Table 2. 
                                                
3 Cases that the firm doesn’t complete the announced plan include: it isn’t implemented within one valid year such as prolonging validity period 
and issuing trans-right shares, the firms announce the failure or giving up implementing, and the firms announce the adjustment. 
4 Market is divided into “bull” and “bear” according to the trend of overall market direction during sustained period. For example, overall market 
direction kept increasing during June in 2005 and October in 2007, so it belongs to “bull” and overall market direction kept falling during 
November in 2007 and October in 2008, so it belongs to “bear”. 
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RESULTS 
 
We investigate: (1) the relationship between market feedback and managers’ final decisions on whether the 
previously announced plan is implemented. (2) The effect of family involvement on this relationship. (3) Whether 
the relationship varies with some factors. We winsorize the variables at 1% level. 
 
Relationship Between Market Feedback and Managers’ Decisions 
 
Table 3. Relationship Between Market Feedback and Managers’ Decisions 
Variables Test1 Test2 
Constant 1.59*(0.059) 1.73*(0.055) 
CAR 1.28***(0.000) 0.85**(0.030) 
Family  -0.07(0.288) 
CAR×Family  1.21**(0.017) 
Market 0.34***(0.002) 0.35***(0.001) 
Larown 0.002(0.284) 0.002(0.295) 
ROA 2.93**(0.028) 2.98**(0.029) 
Lev 0.55*(0.081) 0.54*(0.085) 
Lnsize -0.09**(0.034) -0.10**(0.032) 
Industry YES YES 
Year YES YES 
Chi-Square 31.09 31.08 
Prob(chi-square) 0.000 0.000 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.121 0.122 
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. The italics are the p-values. The sample includes both family firms and non-family firms. CAR is the key 
variable in test 1 while CAR and the interaction are the key variables in test 2. We apply model 1 in the analysis. 
 
It is widely accepted that family involvement in management makes family firms unique. What effect does it bring 
to managers’ attitude towards market feedback? Table 3 displays the results addressing this question. We are 
interested in the coefficients of CAR and the interaction. Coefficient of CAR in test 1 is significantly positive, 
showing that market feedback plays an important role in managers’ final decisions. After observing the 
announcement, market can generate some new information that guides managers. In test 2, coefficients of CAR and 
the interaction are both significantly positive, showing that family involvement can make managers tend to listen to 
the market.5 Do the factors we mentioned above affect their attitude? We answer this question in the following 
sections. 
 
  
                                                
5 Li et al. (2015) argue that family involvement can reduce the probability of managers’ acceptance about market feedback, different from our 
result. This may be attributed to the different classification of family firms. Literature has not reached a consensus on how to identify family 
firms. 
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Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 4. CARs Around Announcement Day 
Table 4-1. Full Sample 
Event period Full sample Completed Adjusted Difference N=459 N=258 N=201 
(-10,10) 0.066 0.079 0.050 0.029** 
(-5,5) 0.057 0.078 0.029 0.049*** 
(-3,3) 0.048 0.062 0.031 0.031** 
Table 4-2: Whether Firm Is High-tech 
 YES NO 
Event period Completed Adjusted Difference Completed Adjusted Difference N=109 N=95 N=149 N=106 
(-10,10) 0.038 0.078 -0.040 0.125 0.027 0.098** 
(-5,5) 0.031 0.065 -0.034 0.112 -0.003 0.115*** 
(-3,3) 0.020 0.077 -0.057 0.093 -0.011 0.104*** 
Table 4-3. Whether Family Members Participate In Purchasing 
 YES NO 
Event period Completed Adjusted Difference Completed Adjusted Difference N=80 N=63 N=178 N=138 
(-10,10) 0.131 0.078 0.053* 0.054 0.041 0.013 
(-5,5) 0.136 0.017 0.119*** 0.052 0.035 0.017 
(-3,3) 0.101 0.028 0.073** 0.044 0.032 0.012 
Table 4-4. Whether Family Members Serve As Managers 
 YES NO 
Event period Completed Adjusted Difference Completed Adjusted Difference N=193 N=122 N=65 N=79 
(-10,10) 0.092 0.019 0.073** 0.061 0.058 0.003 
(-5,5) 0.084 0.011 0.073*** 0.059 0.057 0.002 
(-3,3) 0.070 0.013 0.057*** 0.038 0.058 -0.019 
Table 4-5. Separation Of Control Rights From Ownership 
 Large Small 
Event period Completed Adjusted Difference Completed Adjusted Difference N=135 N=95 N=123 N=106 
(-10,10) 0.087 0.046 0.041 0.078 0.032 0.046** 
(-5,5) 0.083 0.040 0.043 0.072 0.020 0.052** 
(-3,3) 0.055 0.041 0.014 0.068 0.020 0.048** 
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. If firm’s separation of two rights exceeds the median value, it is classified into sample with large 
separation; otherwise it is classified into sample with small separation. 
 
Table 4 lists market reaction to the announcement. To eliminate the effect of measures, we measure market reaction 
with different event windows: [-10, 10], [-5, 5], and [-3, 3]. The difference in Table 4 is between CARs of the firms 
that complete the previously announced plan and those that finally cancel the announced plan. 
 
Table 4-1 is the result of full sample. CARs are all bigger than zero, indicating that market reacts positively to the 
announcement, consistent with most of the studies on the announcement effect of private placement (Tan, 2002; 
Hertzel et al., 2002). Firms finally completing the placement have higher CARs than those that finally cancel the 
plan. Differences between them are all significant, showing that managers listen to the market during private 
placement: managers tend to complete the announced plan when market views them positively and cancel the plan 
when they are not admitted by market. 
 
The results from Tables 4-2 to 4-5 show that, family firms that are non-high-tech, that with family members 
participating in purchasing, that with family members serving as managers, and that with small separation of two 
rights tend to accept market feedback. 
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Multivariate Analysis 
 
Descriptive Analysis and Univariate Comparisons 
 
Table 5 reports the descriptive results of variables. Differences are between firms completing the placements and 
those that finally cancel the announced plans. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics Of Variables 
Variables Completed Adjusted Difference p-value N=258 N=201 
ROA 3.29% 2.80% 0.49% 0.186 
Level 49.45% 51.60% -2.15% 0.184 
Famown 35.04% 34.10% 0.94% 0.478 
Lnsize 21.34 21.18 0.16* 0.072 
Wedge 9.49 8.88 0.61* 0.066 
Tech 50.76% 42.79% 7.97%* 0.089 
Market 57.75% 54.73% 3.03% 0.518 
Part 29.00% 31.84% -2.94%** 0.012 
Serve 61.19% 73.66% -12.47%*** 0.004 
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. The italics are p-values. 
 
Macro environment and information on shareholdings are both the information which can be directly acquired by 
the market. We thus control them in our models. However, Table 5 shows that ROA, Level, Famown, and Market all 
have no significant differences between firms completing the placements and those finally not. We also control the 
effect of firm size and the difference is significant, from which we draw the same conclusion to Luo’s (2005). All 
the other variables have the expected results. 
 
Effect of Market Feedback On Managers’ Decisions 
 
We apply model 2 into this analysis and Table 6 displays the results. In test 1, CAR is the key variable while in tests 
2-6, CAR and the interactions are the key variables.  
 
Table 6. Effect of Market Feedback On Managers’ Decisions 
Variables Test 1 Test2  Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 
Constant 4.06*  4.18** 4.30**  4.95**  3.87*  4.57**  (0.051)  (0.047) (0.045)  (0.026)  (0.061)  (0.036)  
Tech -0.19  0.03  -0.19  -0.23  -0.19  0.06  (0.163)  (0.245)  (0.173)  (0.123)  (0.164)  (0.385)  
CAR 1.29***  3.51***  0.44**  2.46**  2.40***  1.65*  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.041)  (0.030)  (0.004)  (0.085)  
Part 0.01  -0.02 -0.10  0.03  -0.01  -0.14  (0.435)  (0.465)  (0.325)  (0.438)  (0.434)  (0.273)  
Serve 0.69***  0.65***  0.67***  0.45**  0.70*** 0.50**  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.024)  (0.001)  (0.016)  
Wedge 0.02*  0.01*  0.02*  0.02*  0.02**  0.02*  (0.085)  (0.092)  (0.091)  (0.085)  (0.049)  (0.095)  
CAR×Tech  -4.82***     -5.88***  
 (0.001)     (0.000)  
CAR×Part   2.21**    3.36***  
  (0.035)    (0.007)  
CAR×Serve    6.11***   4.21***  
   (0.001)   (0.002)  
CAR×Wedge     -0.11*  -0.14**  
    (0.051)  (0.038)  
Famown 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 (0.238) (0.205) (0.167) (0.181) (0.224) (0.118) 
(Table 6 continued on next page)  
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(Table 6 continued) 
 
Variables Test 1 Test2  Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 
Market 0.18  0.22  0.16  0.18  0.20  0.21  (0.182)  (0.142)  (0.213)  (0.185)  (0.165)  (0.157)  
ROA 0.30  1.04  0.55  -0.56  0.52  1.59 (0.450)  (0.348)  (0.421)  (0.419)  (0.427)  (0.277)  
Lev -0.52  -0.13  -0.48  -0.72  -0.53  -0.13  (0.221)  (0.421)  (0.234)  (0.143)  (0.217)  (0.428)  
Lnsize -0.21**  -0.23**  -0.22**  -0.24**  -0.20**  -0.25**  (0.046)  (0.032)  (0.040)  (0.033)  (0.050)  (0.025)  
χ2 24.71  27.56  27.33  29.85  27.67  39.18  
Prob(χ2) (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.000)  
Nagelkerke R2 0.142  0.167 0.147  0.158  0.146  0.197  
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. The italics are the p-values. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return from -5 to 5 days around 
announcement day. 
 
Test 1 in Table 6 is the result of managers’ final decisions on market feedback. Coefficient of CAR is significantly 
positive, indicating that managers’ final decisions are indeed affected by market feedback. The probability of 
completing the announced plans increases with market’s favorability. Market plays an important role in managers’ 
final decision-making. 
 
In tests 2-5, we put each interaction into the model and test 6 includes all the interactions. Consistent with H2-H4, 
coefficients of the interactions CAR×Tech, CAR×Part, CAR×Serve, and CAR×Wedge are respectively significantly 
negative at 1% level, significantly positive at 5% level, significantly positive at 1% level, and significantly negative 
at 10% level. The results indicate that in final decision-making, managers tend to be affected by market feedback 
when family firm is non-high-tech, when managers are more strongly supervised, when managers are more aligned 
with firms, and when separation of control rights from ownership is smaller.  
 
Family firms in high-tech industry have more inside information, which makes market less informative. Thus 
information asymmetry leads managers to tend to ignore the signal from market. Due to absence from daily 
management, the family may be blinded by managers. Participating in purchasing can offer them more occasions to 
observe managers’ behavior. Namely, family involvement in private placement can make managers place firms’ 
interest in the first, resulting in their tendency to accept market feedback. According to the stewardship theory, 
regardless of ownership, family managers (family members serve as managers) generally behave in firms’ value 
maximization. That is, family managers will regard market feedback as guidance for their decisions in private 
placement. Furthermore, small separation of control rights from ownership can keep firms belonging to the family. 
Thus, the family possesses the incentive to monitor managers (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), thereby increasing the 
probability that managers listen to the market.  
 
In tests 1-6, coefficients of Serve and Wedge are both significantly positive. It may be related to the agency problems 
in Chinese family firms. In China, most of family firms are yet under control of founders. The imperfect corporate 
governance mechanism may lead the family to utilize their information superiority to exploit outsiders. (1) When 
family members sever as managers, as insiders, they have more private information. Under this condition, out of the 
intention to either meet fund demand or expropriate minority shareholders, managers may choose to complete the 
announced plan without considering other factors. (2) Large separation of control rights from ownership can induce 
severe agency problems. On one hand, pyramiding structure can amplify the financial and psychological gap 
between the firm and the family. In this case, private placement may be used by the family to expropriate minority 
shareholders. On the other hand, managers may use private placement to realize personal gains. Hence, when 
separation of the two rights is large and when family members serve as managers, firms are more likely to complete 
the previously announced plans.  
 
Early work on family business mainly focuses on whether managers in family firms behave as agents or stewards 
(Chrisman et al., 2007). Results in Table 6 show that managers in family firms are some extent of combination of 
both. 
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ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
We apply another method to examine managers’ attitude towards market feedback beyond Luo’s (2005) framework. 
According to Kau et al. (2008), if market favors the announced decision and it is finally completed, or market 
disfavors the decision and the plan is finally canceled, then managers accept market feedback. In Figure 1, managers 
listen to the market in area II and III. 
 
Figure 1. Managers’ Attitude Towards Market Feedback 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 7 reports the descriptive results. Table 7-1 show that there are 258 (56.21%) firms completing the announced 
plan and 201 (43.79%) firms finally cancel the plan. Table 7-2 reports the descriptive result of whether managers in 
family firms listen to the market. Result shows that most of managers in family firms accept market feedback. Table 
7-3 is the joint result of Tables 7-1 and 7-2. No matter whether the announced plan is completed, most of managers 
in family firms make final decisions according to market reaction. It indicates that after the announcement, the 
market generates some new information not known to managers and guides them in decision-making. 
 
Table 7. Private Placement And Managers’ Attitude 
Table 7-1. Implement Of Private Placement 
 Completed Incomplete Total Number 258 201 459 
Percent 56.21% 43.79% 100% 
Table 7-2. Managers’ Attitude Towards Market Feedback 
 Accept Not Accept Total Number 267 192 459 
Percent 58.17% 41.83% 100% 
Table 7-3. Joint Results 
 Completed Not Completed 
 Number Percent Number Percent Accept Market Feedback 155 60.08% 112 55.72% 
Not Accept Market Feedback 103 39.92% 89 44.28% 
Note: We use CAR (-5,5) to judge whether managers accept market feedback. 
 
Factors Affecting Managers’ Attitude Towards Market Feedback 
 
Results of model 3 are presented in Table 8. Test 1 is the full sample result. In test 2, inspired by Kau et al. (2008), 
we use the subsample with CAR<0 only, for if market reaction to the announcement is highly positive (CAR>>0), 
managers are not likely to cancel the decision, only if there are other key factors affecting them. Therefore, the 
subsample with CAR<0 is less noisy. 
 
I II 
IV III 
CAR 
YES NO Closing Status 
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Table 8. Results Of Robustness Checks 
Variables Test1 Test2 Full sample CAR<0 
Constant 2.68(0.151) -3.50(0.190) 
Tech -1.12***(0.000) -0.95*(0.002) 
Part 0.42**(0.034) 0.41*(0.061) 
Serve 0.72***(0.001) 0.38*(0.074) 
Wedge -0.02*(0.078) -0.03*(0.095) 
Market -0.07(0.361) -0.55**(0.042) 
Famown 0.01**(0.045) -0.01(0.249) 
ROA -0.11(0.485) 2.08(0.325) 
Level -1.11*(0.064) -1.01(0.162) 
Lnsize -0.07(0.284) 0.25(0.097) 
χ2 43.61 17.89 
Prob(χ2) 0.001 0.036 
Nagelkerke R2 0.181 0.168 
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. The italics are the p-values. We use CAR(-5,5) to judge whether managers accept market feedback. Test 1 
is for full sample. Test 2 is for subsample including CAR<0 only. 
 
In Table 8, all the key variables have the excepted sign, which support H2-H4. In test 1, all of the coefficients of 
Tech, Part, Serve, and Wedge have expected signs, indicating that family firms’ industry can affect the information 
disclosure. Insiders of high-tech family firms hold far more information than the market, leading to the market less 
informative.  
 
Family members’ participation in purchasing strengthens the supervision imposed on managers. Managers under 
weak supervision may ignore long-term benefit in order to realize personal gains. Namely, managers are not likely 
to ignore market feedback when they are strongly monitored.  
 
When family members serve as managers, they know more about the decision. The information asymmetry is less 
severe between controllers and managers while more severe between controllers and outsiders. For example, family 
firms may need much fund to finance a project which may take a very long time to make profits. As Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) posit, outsiders tend to overweight firms’ recent performance at the expense of long-term 
performance. As insiders, managers know more about the projects than the market, resulting in that managers tend 
to ignore market feedback and choose to complete the previously announced plan.  
 
Large separation of control rights from ownership can induce serious agency problems. Managers may abuse their 
power to pursue personal gains, such as more spare time (adjusting the plan may take a long time) and steep 
discounts for passive investors to acquire lax supervision. Wholly speaking, the results are consistent with our 
empirical conclusions. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Apart from redistributing resources among traders in the secondary market, capital market can also generate 
information that guides managers’ decisions. Market feedback to announcements of the relevant decisions is one of 
the valuable sources of information to managers. They can observe market feedback to get a better understanding of 
whether their decisions are value-increasing or value-reducing. Consequently, many studies focus on how managers 
use market feedback to guide their investment decisions, with very few concerning the relation between market 
feedback and financing decisions. However, agency problems between shareholders and managers may blind 
controllers to trust managers, leaving high possibility for managers to pursue personal gains. Thus they may ignore 
market feedback. Furthermore, whether managers in family firms act as agents or stewards have received perennial 
concern. Therefore, this study adds to the literature by examining whether managers in family firms accept market 
feedback in private placement and further explores whether agency problems affect managers’ attitude towards 
market feedback. 
 
We find that managers in family firms generally use market feedback as an input in final decision-making. It is 
affected by three factors: managers’ private information, the supervision imposed on managers, and the corporate 
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governance structure. When managers’ information is less than that of the market, when managers are strongly 
monitored, and when managers are more closely aligned with firms, they tend to listen to the market. 
 
Our work has several implications for future research and managerial practice. As for future research, scholars have 
found that information leakage exists in private placement. Thus, future studies may take it into consideration. As 
for managerial practice, first, information asymmetry can influence managers’ attitude towards market feedback. 
Insufficient information disclosure brings difficulty to market to evaluate firm value, causing stock prices to fall. 
Hence, information transparency of private placement should be improved, especially for high-tech firms. Second, 
family should enhance the supervision on managers and improve managers’ alignment with firms to prevent them 
from pursuing personal gains through private placement or other ways. Third, mechanism of rewards 
and punishments should be established in family firms. Under this mechanism, in the long run, competent managers 
should benefit from good decisions and can quantify the benefits. Conversely, managers who fail to listen to the 
market will bear the costs at their own peril. 
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